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The effects of recent Turkish financial liberalization reforms on the real economy are 
investigated with the aid of a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates 
financial markets. The model is used for conducting counterfactual and comparative static 
simulation experiments to analyze three sets of issues: (1) the real side effects of the 
government's mode of financing its fiscal deficit through debt instruments or monetization; 
(2) the effects of deregulation of the public debt instrument issuing rules on the financial 
markets; and (3) the domestic implications of the continued external debt servicing and 
the foreign exchange rate devaluations. © Society for Policy Modeling, 1997 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s have brought profound diversification in the modes of 
fiscal management for the developing countries, disclosing drastic 
structural shifts in the interplay of fiscal policy with financial mar- 
kets. By 1980, many developing countries were used to rely on 
external sources for public sector deficit financing. However, with 
the drainage of the sources of external finance and the outbreak 
of the debt crisis in the early decade, they found themselves in a 
position where they had to extract resources from the internal 
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markets to sustain their fiscal policies. That in turn meant moneti- 
zation and internal debt accumulation. 
Some governments, like those of Chile and Bolivia, managed 
to cut their deficits through fiscal austerity albeit at significant 
costs of recession, or they resorted to massive xchange rate depre- 
ciations that, along with increased reliance on monetary finance, 
have led to accelerating inflation rates, capital flight, and diminish- 
ing monetary base (World Bank, 1988). Being aware of the infla- 
tionary consequences of monetization, many governments applied 
restrictive monetary policies using the reserve requirement ratio 
as a policy instrument to extract seignorage r venues. Argentina 
increased its reserve requirement on demand deposits to more 
than 70 percent, Brazil to more than 40 percent, and Zaire to 51 
percent (World Bank, 1989). 
Concurrently, a further source of internal finance has been the 
domestic ommercial banking system, either through forced bond 
sales at low interest rates, or through high taxes on financial 
transactions. Monetary contraction under high reserve require- 
ments, coupled with such forced sales of low-interest public securi- 
ties, however, crowded out the private sector from the financial 
markets; discouraged financial intermediation; and increased the 
spread between the deposit and the lending rates. Thus, in spite 
of advances towards financial liberalization, many developing 
countries have suffered from undiversified and fragmented capital 
markets with insufficient returns to financial savings and uncom- 
pensated risks (Blejer and Cheasty, 1989). In the face of ad hoc 
and often contradictionary modes of fiscal finance, these elements 
led to sporadic financial crises and carried with them an enormous 
potential for arbitrary wealth redistribution (Diaz-Alejandro, 
1985). 
Turkey has experienced relatively modest fiscal deficits during 
the 1980s, as compared to the experience of many developing 
nations. However, two additional factors increased the gravity 
of the problem, hindering the potential gains of liberalization 
attempts: One was the realization by the fiscal authorities that 
continued seignorage xtraction through monetization was no 
longer feasible; that is, the Treasury had almost fully exploited 
the Laffer curve. Thus, the deficit had to be increasingly financed 
by domestic sources through semiadministrative government bond 
issues. Secondly, the economy was already experiencing severe 
inflationary shocks due to the high foreign debt servicing require- 
ments and rapid currency depreciation. These factors combined, 
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led to excessively high real interest rates, crowded out private 
investors, and caused significant strain on the domestic financial 
markets. In this paper, I examine this changing nature of deficit 
financing--from direct monetization by way of Central Bank ad- 
vances, to bond issues to the banking system under nonmarket, 
administrative policies--on the "deepening" and the efficacy of 
the domestic financial structures. Specifically, I try to address to 
the policy dilemmas of deficit financing either through bond sales 
or monetary advances, and the macro effects of the existing meth- 
ods of bond financing rules. Further I look at the domestic implica- 
tions of the external resource transfer problem, which manifests 
itself due to massive foreign debt servicing and real currency 
depreciation. 
To this end the paper employs acomputable general equilibrium 
model that embodies characteristic elements from both the real 
and the financial sectors of the Turkish economy. The distinguish- 
ing feature of the modeling exercise is that it accommodates finan- 
cial markets for currency and for credit along with commodity- 
producing real sectors. The financial side of the model reflects 
intermediation between the saving funds and financing of physical 
capital accumulation and of working capital expenses. Further on 
the real side, it allows for inflationary mark-up pricing rules and 
disequilibrium adjustment processes in the commodity and factor 
markets, and incorporates working capital financing of enterprises 
in a financial environment characterized by the dominance of 
public assets and high intermediation costs. 
The paper is organized under four general sections. In the first, 
the characteristic nature of the Turkish financial "deepening" and 
the recent policy reforms towards financial iberalization are dis- 
cussed. In the second, the technical aspects of the model are 
presented. The alternative policy options are simulated and stud- 
ied in the third section, while the last section is reserved for 
concluding comments. 
1A. Mode of Turkish Financial Liberalization in the 1980s 
Turkish attempts towards liberalizing its financial system have 
begun along with the structural adjustment reform program initi- 
ated in 1980. Prior to that, the system revealed all attributes of 
"financial repression" with negative real interest rates, high tax 
burden on financial earnings, and high liquidity and reserve re- 
quirement ratios. Overall, the financial markets have suffered from 
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a highly regulated and inefficient banking system, with consequent 
low-quality portfolio management. Given the underdeveloped and 
fragmented nature of the capital and stock exchange markets, 
corporations had to excessively rely on banking credits rather than 
issuing stocks for financing their working capital balances (OECD, 
1988). The fiscal deficits were mostly financed by direct monetiza- 
tion through the Central Bank. 
On January 1980, with the introduction of a comprehensive 
stabilization program, the overall development s rategy was reori- 
ented from a regulated and inward-looking system to that of an 
outward-oriented open economy operating under market incen- 
tives. The major elements of the reform program were the switch 
to a pegged exchange regime of continuous mini adjustments, 
elimination of price controls and phasing out of subsidies, and the 
gradual removal of trade restrictions towards full commodity trade 
liberalization. Many aspects of the Turkish structural adjustment 
have been well documented in Nas and Odekon (1988); Arlcanll 
and Rodrik (1990); Rodrik (1991), and a thorough assessment of
the post-Reform performance of the economy can be obtained 
from there. 
In retrospect, it can be stated that the mode and pace of financial 
reforms have progressed in leaps and bounds, mostly following 
pragmatic, on-site solutions to the emerging problems. In the 
beginning, the major aim of the reforms had been the deregulation 
of the financial system with a naive approach that such deregula- 
tion would be sufficient in creating a competitive financial struc- 
ture functioning efficiently (Ersel, 1991). The first action under- 
taken was the removal of legal ceilings on deposit interest rates, 
which led to a fierce struggle among banks and the broker institu- 
tions to attract funds from the public. This bonanza of fake "Swit- 
zerlandization" was short-lived, however, and came to a halt with 
the emergence of the 1982 financial crisis, which is extensively 
narrated in Atiyas (1990). 
The foreign exchange regime was liberalized beginning in 1984. 
The banks were allowed to accept foreign deposits from citizens 
and to engage in foreign transactions. Deregulation of restrictions 
on foreign exchange led to enormous pressures towards currency 
substitution. Such pressures led to very high real rates of interest 
throughout the reform period, as the monetary authorities tried 
to defend the Turkish lira (TL) by increasing the real interest rate 
to improve the capital account. However, with liberalization of 
the capital account in 1989, there has been a massive inflow of 
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short-term capital into the domestic economy, and as also wit- 
nessed under the Southern Cone experience, such use of the inter- 
est rate instrument under exchange rate targets led to significant 
crowding out and was severely deflationary (see, e.g., Dornbusch, 
1982; Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
In the credit market, the Central Bank's control over commer- 
cial banks was simplified with a revision of the liquidity and the 
reserve requirement system. An interbank money market for 
short-term borrowing facilities was enacted in 1986. In 1987 the 
Central Bank diversified its monetary instruments by starting open 
market operations, and in October 1989, it abandoned the use of 
rediscount facilities as an instrument of selective credit policy. 
Finally, in early 1990 the Central Bank announced a new monetary 
program based around a new concept of controlling the stock of 
its balance sheet both on the assets and liabilities side, which is 
formulated as the central bank money (CBM). In order to restrain 
the growth of CBM, the Central Bank signed a protocol with 
the Treasury to limit public sector borrowing requirements and 
monetization of the fiscal deficit. Accordingly, the Treasury was 
granted a credit limit of 3.5 trillion TL (9% of budget revenues 
for 1991) with a very low interest rate. For borrowings exceeding 
that amount, market interest rates were to be charged. 
In order to regulate and supervise the capital market, a Capital 
Market Board was established, and it initiated the reopening of 
the Istanbul stock exchange in 1986. In order to encourage equity 
financing, significant ax incentives were granted and since 1986, 
all dividends and capital gains have been exempted from personal 
taxation. 
These measures have had a drastic impact in the domestic econ- 
omy, and all financial indicators howed trends of financial deepen- 
ing (see Table 1). However, contrary to expectations, public sec- 
tor's share in the financial markets remained high. The financing 
behavior of the corporations did not show significant change, and 
credit financing from the banking sector and interfirm borrowing 
continued. Furthermore, the share of private sector securities in 
total financial assets fell (to 6.3% in 1988, as compared to its peak 
of 10.8% in 1982; OECD, 1988, pp. 80-81, and Figure 11). In the 
meantime, total private debt to the commercial banking system 
has doubled in real terms (Akyuz, 1990, p. 109). It can thus be 
argued that in the 1980s private sector financing behavior shifted 
towards hort-term borrowing rather than equity or bond finance. 
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The observed upward trend of the proportion of direct securities 
to GNP, then, originated from the direct new issues of public 
sector securities and Treasury bills. Since the commercial banking 
system has been the major customer of such securities, however, 
the share of aggregate security instruments has fallen in private 
portfolios. In fact, with the implementation f positive interest 
rates, and the new possibility of foreign exchange accounts, the 
advance of financial deepening for the private households has 
meant increased foreign exchange deposits with vigorous currency 
substitution. Thus, it can be stated that the "pioneers of financial 
deepening" in Turkey in the 1980s have been the public sector 
securities and the forex deposits. 
Table 2 portrays the path of the selected policy instruments 
and the yields on financial assets throughout the adjustment-cum- 
liberalization period. Although the presented ata suggest hat 
private bonds and shares, on the average, have yields higher than 
the net rate of returns of the public debt instruments, their margin 
of fluctuation has been very wide and erratic. Consequently, com- 
mercial banks have shifted into government debt instruments. As 
Akyuz (1990, p. 120) attests based on this observation, Turkish 
experience did not conform to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis 
of financial deepening with a shift of portfolio selection from 
"unproductive" assets to those favoring fixed capital formation. 
lB. Patterns of Deficit Financing and Fiscal Repression 
In the early phases of adjustment reforms, Turkish policymakers 
have achieved substantial success in cutting back the size of the 
fiscal deficit and the public sector savings gap. As a share of GNP, 
total real public sector deficit has been reduced to an average of 
1.7 percent between 1980 and 1983 (See Table 3), and the public 
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) has been pulled to 4.3 
percent of the GNP in 1982 (Table 2) from its peak of 10 percent 
in 1980 (OECD, 1988). There also has been significant improve- 
ments in the size of the public savings gap by successful increases 
of public savings and reductions of consumption out of public 
disposable income (Celasun, 1990). 
In the second half of the 1980s, however, especially after the 
1987 civilian elections, indicators of the fiscal authority have 
eroded severely. The PSBR/GNP ratio rose to 7.8 percent in 1987, 
and to 9.4 percent in 1990. There also occurred major structural 
changes in the pattern of deficit financing. As data on Table 3 
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reveal, public sector deficit has been increasingly financed through 
domestic sources. The share of foreign debt finance has fluctuated, 
but has been on a downward trend. Within the composition of 
domestic debt finance, fiscal authorities increasingly relied on bond 
and Treasury bills as instruments of finance, rather than monetiza- 
tion by direct advances from the Central Bank. Until 1985, almost 
60 percent of banknotes has been issued to finance Central Bank's 
such short-term advances. However, that ratio has declined secu- 
larly to reach 20 percent by 1990 (Ulugbay, 1992). Even so, the 
rate of inflation tax has remained high, and reached to 3.4 percent 
of the GNP in 1988 (World Bank, 1990). 
The government has implemented both market and administra- 
tive (nonmarket) mechanisms to transfer esources from the pri- 
vate sector. With the introduction of the auction market for public 
sector debt instruments in 1986, the government has administered 
a complex incentive system to finance its fiscal accounts through 
the domestic financial markets. Government securities have been 
granted tax exemptions and carried a stable and risk-free net yield 
close to other types of securities (see Table 2). But the main 
mechanism that increased their attractiveness for the commercial 
banking system was that they could be held against he liquidity 
(disponibility) requirements, and could be used as collateral in 
the interbank money market. Thus, in many instances the banks 
have voluntarily chosen to purchase government bonds in addition 
to the level they are required to hold as disponibility. 
Bond financing of the public sector deficit under this mechanism 
has had several important consequences for the structural evolu- 
tion of the financial system in Turkey: first, with the secular in- 
crease in the disponibility ratio after 1985, commercial banks were 
induced to increase the volume of government bonds in their 
portfolios and they "quasi-automatically became financiers of the 
fiscal deficit" (OECD, 1988); second, increase in the disponibility 
ratio has limited the effective control of the Central Bank over 
monetary expansion, and in general substituted fiscal policy for 
monetary policy: third, to the extent his substitution was effec- 
tively realized, it caused a reduction in the money multiplier, 
making velocity more volatile and erratic; finally, inducing the 
bank portfolios in favor of the government bonds rather than 
loans, it repressed and crowded out the already shallow markets 
and led to excessive upward pressures on the real interest rates 
(Ersel, 1991). 
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In 1990, the stock of net domestic public debt has reached to 
almost 30 percent of the private financial assets of the banking 
sector; and the aggregate fiscal pressures have, according to the 
World Bank calculations, constituted 33 percent of private savings 
in nominal terms (see Table 3, and the references therein). 
In the next section, I will try to portray the foregoing characteris- 
tic aspects of the domestic economy in the CGE modeling frame- 
work. Then in the section that follows, the model will be used as 
a social laboratory to analyze various sets of policy scenarios with 
respect o financial transactions. 
2. THE CGE MODEL 
The CGE model of the macroeconomy is constructed as a com- 
position of two interdependent real and financial submodels. They 
are linked through various channels of flows of funds, commercial 
bank intermediation, and the government's fi cal policy. The real 
side of the economy can be said to share the common folklore of 
static macromodeling, which has been laid out in Adelman and 
Robinson (1978) and in Dervis, Robinson and de Melo, (1982), 
and is built around four production sectors (agriculture, industry, 
commerce, and public services), four households (rural, urban 
labor, industrial, and commercial capitalist), and a government. 
The rest of the world is aggregated as one broad entity engaging 
into foreign relations with the domestic economy. 
On the financial side, the model shares elements of the so-called 
"maquette" of Bourguignon, de Melo, and Suwa (1991), which is 
further summarized in Robinson (1991). Formally it extends the 
model utilized by Lewis (1985, 1992), which studied the structural 
elements of financial repression using the Turkish experience as 
an archetype case. The current model recognizes five different 
sets of actors engaged in portfolio choice and financial activity: 
households, private enterprises, government, Central Bank, and 
the commercial banks. Five types of financial assets are specified 
for interplay in the financial submodel: domestic and foreign cur- 
rency, public and private bonds, and saving deposits. 
The overall model is brought into equilibrium through aWalra- 
sian tatonnement adjustment mechanism based on the endoge- 
nous iteration of market prices, the interest rate and the foreign 
exchange rate to clear the product markets, the credit markets, 
and the balance of payments. In the labor markets, the wage rates 
are assumed to be fixed nominally, and thus are cleared through 
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quantity adjustments of employment. In industry, the market price 
is hypothesized to be set by monopolistic producers by downward- 
rigid markups over variable costs. This specification is imple- 
mented in order to capture the high concentration a d noncompet- 
itive pricing rules thought o be prevalent in various branches of 
manufacturing industry (see, e.g., Karaaslan, 1989, and Aksoy, 
1982, on evidence of markup ricing behavior in Turkish manufac- 
turing). Boratav (1991) documents further evidence arguing that 
oligopolistic markups display upward flexibility at times of acceler- 
ating inflation, but they tend to be constant during periods of low/ 
falling inflation rates. Based on Boratav's findings, the model 
adopts--in the terminology of Gibson, Lustig, and Taylor, 
(1986)--Kaleckian mechanism ofconstant markups under periods 
of price deflation; yet, during inflation, is characterized by the 
Marx-Sraffian wage-profit rade-off with flexible markups, ad- 
justed upwards by the rate of inflation. Consequently, industrial 
output supply is determined by aggregate final demand, given the 
markup-based market price. The possibilities of markup pricing 
result in both a distorted price structure and income composition 
favoring profit/rent recipients as discussed extensively in Boratav 
(1990), and Yeldan (1992). For agriculture and services, given the 
lack of empirical evidence on market structure, marginal cost 
pricing rules are assumed along with a neoclassical production 
function to determine the output supply. 
The domestic money market is brought into equilibrium through 
perturbations of the overall price level, generating inflationary 
pressures in the domestic economy. Thus, any disequilibrium in 
either side of the overall model calls for a simultaneous adjustment 
in both the commodity and the financial markets. Consequently, 
the model is able to capture an endogenous price inflation story 
based on structural rigidities and conflicting claims of various 
social classes for national output. 
Since nominal wages are fixed, level of urban employment be- 
comes endogenous, enabling perturbations on levels of output 
supply. Labor hire decisions of the firms depend upon real wage 
costs along profit maximization rules. Thus, changes in the price 
level as aggravated by financial variables may lead to strong nonho- 
mogenous effects on the real side through nominal wage fixity. 
Accordingly, an important mode of adjustment in the commodity 
and factor markets can be traced out through a stimulus in aggre- 
gate final demand: As pressures build up in the commodity mar- 
kets, producer prices rise and the demand for money increases 
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leading to price inflation. The increase in the price level causes 
real wages to fall, as wages are fixed nominally. Consequently 
labor employment, and hence output supply, both increase. This 
process portrays the classic Keynesian motto: "Output is supplied 
(labor is demanded) because it is demanded"; in contrast o the 
(neo)classical motto or the well-celebrated Say's Law: "Output is 
demanded, because it is supplied." Overall then, the closure of 
the model is "Keynesian," invoking price and quantity adjustment 
based on demand-determined production. 
On the foreign trade side, the model adopts the traditional 
treatment of foreign economic relations as utilized in many CGE 
applications: the Armingtonian commodity system for determin- 
ing import demand, the constant elasticity of transformation speci- 
fication in allocation of export and domestic sales, and external 
closure rules through changes in nominal exchange rate or through 
endogenous flows of external finance. 
The algebraic equations of the model are formally documented 
in Appendix Table 1. In what follows, I will highlight he important 
components of the model, referring the interested reader to the 
formal documentation. 
The Financial Sector 
The financial sector of the economy is depicted in Equations 1 
through 14, and an overview can be seen in the balance sheets as 
portrayed in Figure 1. 
Equation 1 states that households' financial wealth in the current 
period is the sum of previous period's wealth and the flow of 
current financial savings. Allocation of this wealth into the above- 
mentioned financial assets is achieved via Equations 2-6. Interest- 
bearing saving deposits are assumed to be an increasing function 
(3) of the real interest rate. Demand for foreign currency is an 
increasing function (4) of the real exchange rate, but it decreases 
with respect o the rate of real interest. Domestic currency de- 
mand, on the other hand, follows a standard "quantity theory" 
formulation (5) with velocity being considered as a function of 
national income and the nominal interest rate. Households' de- 
mand for bonds is determined in Equation 6 as an increasing 
function of the real rate of return on bonds. 
The rate of interest is also an important variable adding nonho- 
mogeneity to the real sphere of the macroeconomy, and its role 
has to be explicitly noted in the households' financial behavior. 
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Households 
Assets 
Domestic urrency (M °) 
Foreign currency (FCUR) 
Saving deposits (TDEP) 
Government bonds (GBNDH) 
Private bonds (PBND) 
Liabilities 
Private financial wealth (PFW) 
Commercial Banks 
Assets 
Credits to enterprises (LOAN D) 
Gov. bonds held for disponibility 
Bonds purchased-voluntary 
Required reserves at CB (p-TDEP) 
Liabilities 
Saving deposits (TDEP) 
Enterprises 
Assets 
Working capital balances (KW) 
Private Investment (DKP) 
Liabilities 
Loans from com. banks (LOAN D) 
Private bonds issued (PBND) 
Government 
Assets Liabilities 
Gov. bonds issued (GBND) 
Gov. borrowing abroad (GBOR) 
Gov. borrowing from CB (monetization) 
TOTAL: Government's fiscal deficit 
Central Bank 
Assets 
Gov. borrowing from CB 
Foreign reserves (FRES) 
Liabilities 
Domestic urrenty supply (M s) 
Required reserves (p.TDEP) 
Figure 1. Financial balance sheets. 
Accordingly, aggregate saving decisions of the households epend 
exclusively on their saving propensities out of their disposable 
income (Equation 42) following the Keynesian tradition (and the 
approaches by Lewis, 1985, and Rosenweig and Taylor, 1990), 
with the interest rate assuming no role in the level of this aggregate. 
The allocation of the private portfolio, however, is interest sensi- 
tive. The real rate of interest plays a further crucial role in the 
portfolio decision between the domestic and foreign currency sub- 
stitution. Foreign currency, in this form, is stored entirely for 
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"hedging" purposes and serves as ready liquidity, with a rate 
return of real depreciation i excess of the real rate of interest. 
In this sense, the real interest rate is considered as an important 
monetary variable for the Central Bank in controlling the magni- 
tude of foreign currency substitution and runaway from domestic 
money. Thus, an important channel of upward pressure on the 
rate of interest recognized in the model is that of the threat of 
foreign currency substitution as a store of financial wealth. 
A further ole of the interest rate in the model is that of equaliza- 
tion of the credit funds market (Equation 61). Private enterprises 
demand credit from the commercial banking sector for financing 
their private investment expenditures and part of their working 
capital balances (11 ). Private investment demand (Equation 9) is in 
the tradition of Tobin's q formulation (Tobin, 1969), with private 
investment increasing with respect o the real profit rate and de- 
creasing with respect o the real interest rate. The interest elastic- 
ity, e, of private investments is thought o be comparably lower 
than that of saving deposits, ~, to signify the underdeveloped 
nature of the credit market and the historically excessive reliance 
of the enterprises on banking credits in financing their investment 
decisions (Ersel, 1991). The working capital costs of firms are 
considered to be determined asa fixed ratio, kwr, of total variable 
costs in Equation 10. An important decision for the private firms 
is the ratio, ~, of bond financing of their total working capital 
balances (8). Accordingly, private bonds are issued at the rate 
w.KW, and the remainder of the balance is financed by credit 
loans from the commercial banking sector. 
The government's portfolio behavior is also of the same type. 
Given the fiscal deficit (Equation 41), the government makes a 
crucial policy decision in its deficit financing either through bond 
issuing (Equation 7) at the rate % or via direct borrowing from 
the Central Bank (monetization) (Equation 14). The realization 
of "y has different effects in the macro balances, as the simulation 
experiments below will attest. 
Government's debt instruments are sold almost exclusively to 
the commercial banking system under both administrative (non- 
market) and market-ridden mechanisms. As discussed extensively 
in the previous ection, commercial banks are granted the option 
of holding government bonds against heir liquidity requirements, 
k.TDEP. Consequently, demand for public bonds by the banks 
consists of two expressions inEquation 12 to reflect he administra- 
tive and market-based components: The first expression is the 
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disponibility-related (captive) bond holdings, while the second 
gives the voluntary bond demand as a function of the real rate of 
return on bonds, BRR. Based on the historical data of realized 
yields on such risk-free government debt instruments, it is assumed 
that banks would always be willing to match their disponibility 
requirements with their purchases of government bonds. 
More generally, captive market will be effective only if the rate 
of return on GDIs is greater than the rate of return on holding 
money. The constraint becomes totally ineffective if the rate of 
return on GDIs is higher than the possible investment alternatives. 
In the former case, which gives the lower threshold, banks will 
be indifferent between holding GDIs and money as reserves. In 
the latter case, banks will be willing to hold GDIs not only for 
reserves but also as investment assets. Hence the constraint be- 
comes ineffective as such voluntary holdings of GDIs increase in 
bank portfolios. 
Total loanable funds are determined as the difference between 
total saving deposits and bond acquisition in Equation 13. The 
real rate of interest acts as the equilibrating variable to satisfy 
Equation 13. In this process, the model captures the effects of 
financial squeeze emanating from the policy of dumping of the 
fiscal deficits on the credit markets. As government's bond financ- 
ing ratio increases, the interest rate is bid up, as a portion of the 
private financial funds is capitalized by bond financing of the 
deficit. This process leads to crowding out of the private investment 
via Equation 9, and deflation of the price level by reducing the 
liabilities of the Central Bank, and leading to contraction of the 
domestic urrency supply via Equation 14. 
The Central Bank acts as the monetary authority regulating the 
supply of domestic urrency and of private credit (Equation 14). 
In conducting its monetary policy, the reserve requirement ratio, 
p, is considered to be the primary tool of the Central Bank. 
However, not all of the legal reserves are under the control of 
the Central Bank as the monetary authority, because a portion, 
h. TDEP, of reserves at the commercial banks are held as govern- 
ment securities against heir liquidity requirements and in effect 
can be considered under the control of the Treasury. 
The real side of the macroeconomy follows the treatment of 
the traditional CGE models, and because detailed expositions of 
these models are available (see, e.g., Adelman and Robinson, 
1978; Dervis et al., 1982; Robinson, 1988), discussion here will be 
brief. Price formation equations are given in the second block of 
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Appendix Table 1. Output of agriculture and industry are fully 
traded, whereas commercial exports are given net of imports due 
to data limitations. 
The market price of industrial output is determined monopolis- 
tically through additional markups over prime costs together with 
conditions of price inflation (Equation 22). The output supply is 
then demand-determined, andthe neoclassical specification of 
production technology (Equation 23) is omitted for industry. Inter- 
est expenses on loans are also cited among the working capital 
expenses and constitute a significant source of total costs squeezing 
industrial value added (Equations 19 and 26). 
The production technology for the nonindustrial sectors follows 
a CES specification with limited substitution possibilities among 
physical capital and labor. Stocks of physical capital are thought 
to be fixed, leading to upward-sloping supply schedules due to 
diminishing returns. Further, capital is given as a composite entity, 
made up of different composition coefficients, bij, across sectors. 
A CES function is formulated between the imported and the 
domestically produced good to obtain the Armingtonian composite 
(Equation 45). The export supply is determined via the CET 
specification on Equations 44 and 49. Private consumption de- 
mands follow fixed sectoral shares with the assumption that the 
underlying utility functionals are of the Cobb-Douglas type. Ag- 
gregate public consumption (53) and public investment (54) are 
nominally fixed, leading to financial squeeze as discussed above. 
Equations 57 to 62 specify the market clearing conditions in the 
domestic economy. The commodity markets of the nonindustrial 
sectors clear via endogenous price movements through the Walra- 
sian tatonnement, whereas the level of industrial output adjusts 
to quantity demanded asits price is predetermined. In the domestic 
currency market, the interaction of the real rate of interest with 
changes in the price level is considered tobe the adjusting variable, 
whereas the balance of payments equilibrium is obtained by en- 
dogenous movement of the nominal exchange rate. Bond market 
clears through forced acquisition of public and private bonds in 
Equation 60. The credit market equation (61) is repeated here 
for convenience, and it merely spells out the banks' portfolio 
balance of Equation 13. The saving-investment balance of Equa- 
tion 62 does not actually constitute an independent condition of 
the system, as the realization of overall macroequilibrium guaran- 
tees its satisfaction by Walras' Law. It is, however, imposed as a 
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residual check on the behavior of the domestic economy. Determi- 
nation of equilibria in the financial markets is further depicted in 
Figure 2. 
An important limitation of the model is its static nature. Thus, 
expectations formation and realizations of capital gains as offered 
by the arbitrage opportunities are not explicitly admitted for pri- 
vate households. As for the banking sector, it is implicitly assumed 
that there exists sufficient competitive pressure to equalize the 
deposit and the credit rates of interest; or alternatively, banks 
open credits to their "most favored customers" under conditions 
of zero net profits. Thus, commercial profits originate only in 
the real sphere and mostly accrue to the commercial capitalist 
household. 
The model is calibrated to 1987, a year in which the domestic 
economy is considered to be relatively in macroequilibrium. The 
selection of the values of key parameters in the base-year is docu- 
mented in the Appendix Table 2, and the 1987 state of the economy 
can be read through the first column of Tables 4 and 5. 
3. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL POLICIES 
In this section, with the aid of the CGE model, we examine 
analytically the general equilibrium effects of the conduct of fiscal 
and financial policies to sustain the government's fi cal accounts. 
The experiments are implemented via time-independent, s atic 
perturbations of the policy parameters around their base-run val- 
ues to capture the macro effects of the historically observed policy 
maneuvers of the government, and to seek out new policy options. 
Specifically, the policy scenarios address three distinct but inter- 
related issues: (1) the macro effects and the policy dilemmas con- 
fronted as a result of the government's choice of financing its fiscal 
deficit either through internal borrowing by bond issues or through 
direct monetization; (2) the macro effects of the alternative modes 
of bond financing of fiscal deficit and its repercussions on the 
financial markets; and (3) the domestic implications of continued 
foreign debt servicing and of devaluationary policies on the real and 
financial sectors of the macroeconomy. The policy experiments are 
carried under four simulation exercises, and are reported sequen- 
tially in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4: Financial Equilibrium of the Domestic Economy (Flow Values in 
Billion 1987 TL) 
Base run E1 E2 E3 E4 
Price level 1.000 0 .977  0.999 1.011 1.049 
Real interest rate (%) 5.3 5.9 5.2 4.8 5.9 
Real rate of return on GDIs (%) 5.1 8.9 40.3 1.0 1.8 
Nominal exchange rate (TL/$) 856.4 845 .8  855 .7  858 .1  883.3 
Public sector fiscal portfolio 
Fiscal revenues 17037.6 17457.6 17041.3 16910.2 16824.9 
Fiscal expenses 19992.6 20496.8 19997.5 19841.3 19494.6 
Deficit financing 
Domestic 2115.2 2188.1 2116.9 2096.2 1842.1 
New GDIs issued 1480.7 1969.3 1481.8 1257.7 1289.5 
Monetization 634.6 218.8 635.1 838.5 552.6 
Gross external borrowing 839.7 851.1 839.3 834 .9  827.6 
Gross external transfers 1413.4 1432.4 1412.7 1405.2 1741.2 
Private households' portfolio 
Aggregate private savings 9141.5 9235.2 9144.7 9213.2 8969.2 
Private financial savings 5485.9 5541.1 5486.8 5527.9 5381.5 
Stock of financial wealth a 3447.2 3537.0 3448.1 3420.6 3294.1 
Savings deposits at banks 19506.9 20270.8 19461.2 19138.0 18924.1 
Bonds purchased 79.0 90.7 121.9 73.4 71.9 
Domestic urrency demand 18285.7 18306.9 18296.1 18373.4 17392.6 
Foreign currency demand b 3991.7 4041.7 3994.9 3984.1 3870.2 
Private enterprises' balance sheet 
Private investment 7026.3 7047.1 7027.8 7117.0 7127.1 
Working capital expenses 9995.7 10209.4 9994.2 9784.3 9538.8 
Interest expenses 522.1 587 .3  511 .4  464 .9  558.7 
Private bonds issued 99.9 102.1 99.9 97.8 95.4 
Central Bank's balance sheet 
Nominal stock of domestic urrency 
(end of period) 18285.7 17884.9 18290.5 18575.1 18244.8 
Loans to treasury (monetization) 634.6 218 .8  635.1 838.5 552.6 
Required reserves at CB 1804.4 1875.0 1800.3 1770.3 1750.5 
Commercial banks' balance sheet 
Deposits 19506.9 20270.8 19461.2 19138.0 18924.1 
GDI holdings 1501.6 1980.7 1459.9 1282.1 1312.9 
Captive (disponibility) 1302.6 1694.6 0.0 1120.1 1148.2 
Voluntary 199.0 286.0 1459.9 162 ,0  164.7 
Credits to enterprises 16200.9 16415.1 16201.1 16085.6 15860.7 
Reserves at CB 1804.4 1875.0 1800.3 1770.3 1750.5 
Notes :  a Trillion 1987 TL 
b Million $ 
El. Increase Bond Financing of the Fiscal Deficit 
E2. Eliminate Captive Bond Sales and Reduce Disponsibility Ratio 
E3. Increase Monetization of the Fiscal Deficit 
E4. Increase Government External Transfers, Adjustment with Currency Depreciation 
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Tab le  5: Production Employment  and Income Generat ion (Billions 1987 TL) 
Base run E1 E2 E3 E4 
Real GDP 58200.9 57850.7 58205.1 58543.4 56402.9 
Real output 
Agriculture 14095.8 12546.6 14067.6 14359.3 14359.3 
Industry 57613.1 58751.4 57629.8 57147.3 53995.9 
Commerce 18450.6 18684.7 18447.1 17839.7 18829.3 
Public service 13750.9 13672.4 13758.4 13931.2 13022.4 
Employment ~ 
Rural 9034.9 7428.4  9003.4  9335.0  9335.0 
Urban 7184.4 7253.6  7187.7  7163.1  7022.8 
Agricultural TOT 100.0 91.5 101.2 102.7 93.2 
Total variable costs 
Agriculture 10042.1 8563.1  10013.4 1(1321.1 9909.7 
Industry 41681.1 42572.6 41674.9 40799.6 39766.3 
Commerce 8518.5 8925.6  8519.6  7952.7  8602.1 
Public service 4986.6 5024.8  4995.6  5139.5  4254.1 
Real wage rate 
Rural 0.632 0.647 0.633 0.625 0.602 
Urban 1.639 1.670 1.634 1.614 1.556 
Real profit rate (%) 
Agriculture 21.2 14.6 21.1 22.3 20,9 
Industry 18.1 18.4 18.1 18.9 19,6 
Commerce 12.7 14.5 12.7 9.5 14,5 
Public service 14.2 13.3 14.4 17.5 6,5 
Private disposable income 
Rural 10875.0 8764.2  10829.3 11251.9 10858,8 
Urban labor 8096.9 8467.3  8097.1  7805.1  7993,4 
Industrial capitalist 12050.9 12336.5 12049.8 12691.5 13412.6 
Commercial capitalist 17944.6 18804.4 17992.3 17634.0 14840.3 
Public income 
Income taxes 7298.1 7522.7  7302.0  7263.8  7164.3 
Trade taxes 2050.4 2096.5  2049.7  2033.0  1944.6 
Production taxes 4307.8 4327.3  4307.1  4351.4  4406.3 
Indirect axes 3312.2 3440.9  3313.4  3193.1  3241.1 
Consumption demand 
Private 39027.6 38328.0 39025.9 39375.1 37348.6 
Public 5308.2 5446.8  5309.8  5267.3  5072.3 
Private investment by sector 
of destination 
Agriculture 502.6 490.6 502.6 505.3 501.0 
Industry 2071.8 2069.7  2072.7  2081.8  2077.7 
Commerce 787.5 790.8 787.7 779.7 790.7 
Public service 2936.6 2921.1  2939.2  2974.8  2847.6 
Exports b
Agriculture 792.4 797.4 792.4 789.9 799.2 
Industry 8174.9 8205.1  8175.4  8159.9  8059.8 
Imports b 
Agriculture 826.4 632.5 823.0 868.2 834.6 
Industry 13460.7 13686.7 13464.3 13400.7 12932.4 
Notes :  a 1000 x person-years 
b millions, 1987 U.S.$ 
El. Increase Bond Financing of the Fiscal Deficit 
E2. Eliminate Captive Bond Sales and Reduce Disponibility Ratio 
E3. Increase Monetization of the Fiscal Deficit 
E4. Increase Government External Transfers, Adjustment with Currency Depreciation 
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3A. Financing of the Fiscal Deficit through Government Debt 
Instruments 
The first experiment evolves around the government's choice 
of financing of a given fiscal deficit. Given its deficit, GRDEF, the 
government finances a portion, % of it by issuing GDIs, and the 
rest, (1-~/), is monetized by direct advances from the Central Bank. 
As discussed in Section 1 above, in the second half of the decade, 
Turkish fiscal authorities have increasingly relied on domestic 
financing of the fiscal deficit through bond issues in contrast o 
monetary finance. 
In Experiment El,  I simulate the macro effects of this policy 
maneuver by increasing the bond financing rate, ~/, to 0.90--its 
historically observed average for 1987-92. The net effects of the 
experiment follow those classic mechanisms ofadjustment tomon- 
etary contraction. As the pace of monetization of the fiscal deficit 
is reduced, supply of domestic urrency shrinks (in nominal terms) 
in the Central Bank's balance sheet (Equation 14). Consequently, 
domestic price level deflates. In the meantime, in order to sustain 
its increased sales of bonds, the government finds it necessary to 
increase the bond interest rate in the bond market. In the banking 
system, funds are redirected toward acquisition of government 
bonds, and the cost of credit increases. Private households switch 
their portfolios towards bonds and deposits to take advantage of 
the increased returns of these assets. Furthermore, as the exchange 
rate depreciates in real terms, demand for foreign currency in- 
creases as well. This phenomenon puts added pressure on the real 
rate of interest o rise in order to dampen the switch against he 
domestic urrency. 
The effect of price deflation on relative prices is not neutral 
due to added imperfections on the factor and product markets. 
Since urban wages have been fixed in nominal terms, real wage 
costs increase at a time of price deflation. However, as final price 
is protected in industry by way of downward-fixed markups, in- 
creased wage and rental costs are passed on to the consumers. 
Downward-fixity of the markups in this manner, de facto fixes the 
relative price of industry against the rest of the economy, and 
restricts the process of adjustment of the price system, a mecha- 
nism that is highlighted in Lewis (1985). Furthermore, the fall in 
the aggregate price level in the face of protected urban prices 
causes a downward adjustment in the relative price of agriculture. 
Terms of trade deteriorate for the rural economy. Commerce, on 
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the other hand, booms due to increased rate of return to financial 
assets, which raises profitability of that sector (Equation 27). 
The results of the Experiment E1 highlight many attributes of 
the adjustment experience of the real sector to financial reforms 
of the 1980s; deterioration of agricultural incomes, and a heavy 
transfer of resources to the urban sectors, especially to financial 
services (Mutlu, 1990; Yeldan, 1994), rapid increases in the share 
of profits in the industrial sector (Boratav, 1991), increased interest 
expenditures in industrial value added (Ozmucur, 1991), and hesi- 
tant recovery of private fixed investment (Rittenberg, 1991). 
3B. Reforming the Public Sector Debt Instruments 
Experiment E1 analyzes the policy options of deregulation of 
public sector dominance in the bond market. Here I simulate an 
environment where public bonds are offered in a competitive 
market in which banks no longer claim bonds to sustain their 
liquidity requirements. Thus, Equation 12 of commercial banks' 
bond demand now consists of only the voluntary part, being a 
function entirely of BRR. Furthermore, I complement this policy 
scenario with a significant reduction of the disponibility require- 
ment ratio. Reduction of the liquidity (disponibility) ratio is among 
the long-stated policy reform suggestions advocated by many out- 
side circles (see, e.g., OECD, 1988); and evidently, with the re- 
moval of the disponibility-related (captive) function of GDI hold- 
ings, the rationale of keeping the liquidity ratios at their high 
levels loses much of its justification. 
As expected, the real rate of return that has to be offered by 
the government rises sharply to 40 percent, while the effects on 
the interest rate remain mixed: First, the increase of the rate of 
return on GDIs together with the persistent pressures of bond 
financing of the fiscal deficit prolong contraction of the credit 
market and tend to push the rate of interest up. However, reduc- 
tion of the disponibility ratio lowers the overall cost of credit and 
countervails these pressures, and consequently, changes of the 
real interest rate over its base-run value remain modest. 
Private households now faced with increased yields on bonds 
direct their portfolios to bond purchases, and the bond market 
"deepens" to favor private transactors. However, given the static 
nature of the current model, we cannot study either the feasibility 
or the long-term consequences of this policy maneuver. Particu- 
larly, we were not able to trace out the long-term dynamics of 
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debt financing at very high rates of interest. Treasury of our current 
model has simply chosen to postpone the inflationary pressures, 
with expected price acceleration i the longer run. 
3C. Monetization of the Fiscal Deficit 
In the previous experiment, we noted that the surge in the GDI 
rate of interest may signify a problem in the mode of deficit 
financing. Thus, the fiscal authority will likely be forced to resort 
to monetization of the fiscal deficit. To study the effects of this 
possible move, I conduct Experiment E3 and reduce the value of 
~/in Equations 7 and 14. The results of the experiment reveal the 
inflationary consequences of such a move, and also highlight he 
rigidity of the bond market, which operates under the dominance 
of administrative rules of public securities. As the supply of public 
bonds recedes, the bond market contracts, and its rate of return 
falls severely (see Figure 2), while the increased availability of 
funds in the banking system puts downward pressure on the inter- 
est rate. 
The gross domestic product booms in the short run as a result 
of the classic Keynesian mechanisms ofmonetary expansion. With 
respect to the relative consequences of this boom, however, quali- 
tatively different results are obtained as compared to the previous 
experiments: Commercial services contract, terms of trade favor 
agriculture, and real wages fall. Industry, on the other hand, main- 
tains its profitability due to the asymmetric treatment ofoligopolis- 
tic markups. The specification of upward-flexible industrial mark- 
ups protects the position of industrial capital in aggregate value 
added, and adds a further pressure on price inflation--a route 
that is discussed extensively in Yeldan (1992). 
This experiment highlights the fact that the rate of return on 
bonds under the current specification is almost entirely supply- 
determined, an is very sensitive to public sector's policy decisions. 
The dominance of the public sector represses the asset markets 
and causes them to be oversensitive to macroadjustment. The 
arms-length sale of the bulk of the public debt instruments o the 
commercial banking system so as to satisfy the liquidity require- 
ments inhibits the role of the rate of return in equilibrating the 
bond market. Yet, as seen in Experiment E2, liberalization of 
the bond market by eliminating the captive bond holdings by the 
banking system results in prohibitively high GDI rates of interest. 
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Clearly, the resolution of the dilemma lies in the real sphere of 
the economy, in the mitigation of the sources of fiscal repression. 
31). The Role of External Transfers and Currency Depreciation 
A further constraint in the Turkish financial markets emanates 
from the external debt servicing requirements. Under Experiment 
E4, we examine the domestic impact of external resource transfers 
by way of government's foreign debt repayments and exchange 
rate devaluation. Since the early phases of its implementation, 
the international donor agencies have generated quite a conducive 
environment for Turkish efforts in structural adjustment in terms 
of SALs, debt relief, and technical aid. In 1980, such aid amounted 
to a resource transfer of 4.7 percent of GDP into the domestic 
economy, with Turkey singly accounting for nearly 70 percent of 
the volume of debt rescheduled internationally b  the developing 
countries in the 1978-80 period (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989). After 
1984, however, especially with the termination of the OECD debt 
relief, the direction of such transfers was reversed, and Turkey 
was faced with a pressing need to generate an additional external 
surplus to service its foreign debt. The ratio of external debt 
service in aggregate GDP, which stood at 2.4 percent in 1980, has 
increased to 7.2 percent in 1985, and stabilized around 80 percent 
throughout the rest of the decade (OECD, 1988, 1989). 
Previous tudies conducted by Anand, Chhibber, and van Wijn- 
bergen (1988) argued that external debt is not threatening Tur- 
key's creditworthiness at current levels, and that tighter external 
policies would lead to a high cost in terms of lost output growth and 
would have destabilizing consequences for the internal markets. 
We study the overall effects of the external resource transfer 
issue by way of increasing the base-run level of government trans- 
fers by 25 percent in U.S.$ terms. We let the domestic economy 
to adjust externally via currency depreciation. 
We observe that the immediate ffect of the simulation is a 
significant depreciation of the nominal exchange rate due to the 
squeeze of foreign funds in the balance of payments accounts. 
The real interest rate rises both as a result of the spillover of this 
effect on the domestic funds, and also as a result of increasing 
pressures of the threat of currency substitution. With rising import 
and interest costs, price inflation escalates. The GDP contracts, 
and real industrial output falls, while commercial services experi- 
ence a boom due to intensified financial activity as offered by 
increasing interest rates and currency depreciation. 
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With the achieved contraction of GDP, the size of public expen- 
ditures, and hence the government's domestic borrowing require- 
ment falls. Consequently, the rate of bond issues reduces with a 
significant fall in the real rate of return offered in equilibrium. 
The impact of currency devaluation is yet another aspect of the 
external adjustment. Currency devaluation has been an integral 
part of Turkish structural adjustment reforms ince their initiation. 
Notwithstanding its rapid and unexpected appreciation i  1990-91, 
pressures on depreciation of the continued, at least in well-settled 
norms of private expectations. Previous tudies on Turkish foreign 
exchange administration have concluded that prolonged use of 
the depreciation i strument has had both inflationary and contrac- 
tionary effects on the domestic economy. Onis and Ozmucur 
(1990), on the basis of their econometric analysis for instance, 
have found a spiraling feedback relation of vicious circles "through 
which the exchange rate effect is rigidly translated into domestic 
prices and costs and back to the exchange rate" (p. 136). Further- 
more, in a similar modeling exercise, Kopits and Robinson (1989) 
state that in the presence of high fiscal deficits and the pressing 
need for monetary accommodation u der sticky prices and/or 
inflationary expectations, currency depreciation might lead to an 
uncontrollable surge in inflation. In their simulations they have 
found that, based on an unchanged PSBR complemented with a 
reduced rate of real depreciation during 1981-87, Turkey would 
have experienced significant success in lowering its inflation rate 
(by almost 6.5% less per annum), at a relatively modest cost in 
terms of potential output foregone (with less than 1% reduction 
in real GDP growth). Finally, devaluationary policy has also had 
the adverse ffect on fiscal balances as it increased the domestic 
currency value of the government's external financial obligations 
in real terms (Akyuz, 1990). 
That prolonged evaluationary policy may have contractionary 
effects on real output with problematic ncome distribution conse- 
quences is a well-debated issue in the literature (see, e.g., the 
seminal papers by Diaz-Alejandro, 1963; Krugman and Taylor, 
1978; and Taylor, 1983). More recently, Lizondo and Montiel 
(1989) have formalized several channels of contractionary influ- 
ence of devaluations that can be succintly summarized as: (1) the 
relative price effects unfavorable to a large nontraded sector; (2) 
the real income effects causing a fall in aggregate demand; (3) 
income redistribution effects that cause an increase in aggregate 
savings and tend to be contractionary in the short run through 
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the Keynesian multiplier mechanisms; (4) supply-side ffects due 
to the increase in costs of intermediate imports; and (5) the real 
wealth effects causing a reduction in absorption as agents cut back 
their expenditures in order to replenish their desired real money 
holdings in the presence of currency depreciation. 
The simulation results as reported under Experiment E4 also 
seem to confirm many of the stagflationary mechanisms cited 
above, suggesting as well one further route, that of increased 
interest costs in the presence of the threat of currency substitution. 
Under the experiment, with the ongoing exchange rate adjustment 
of 3 percent (in nominal terms), the real interest rate is pushed 
upwards to maintain the demand for domestic currency. With 
upward-flexible markups in such an inflationary environment, the 
model simulates the vicious circle of price inflation-currency de- 
preciation spiral as discussed in Onis and Ozmucur (1990). 
Thus the model results suggest hat the increased pace of debt 
servicing in the latter half of the decade has had dire implications 
for the domestic economy. It has been a significant source of 
price inflation, has been severely contractionary in the production 
sphere, and has repressed the fragile bond market. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we tried to investigate the interaction of the real 
and the financial sectors of the Turkish economy in its different 
phases of financial liberalization and the alternating modes of 
deficit financing by utilizing the CGE model as a simulation device. 
In the context of the Turkish reality, the CGE investigation of 
the macroeconomy has shown that: 
. 
. 
The conduct of fiscal policy toward financing the public deficit 
through bond issuing or monetization has significant diverse 
effects on real output, employment, and the movement of 
the interest and the foreign exchange rates; 
Both the claims of the government on the domestic financial 
markets and the threat of currency substitution exert upward 
pressure on the interest rate, causing the financial markets 
to remain shallow, and leading to contraction of the private 
investments and real output. The administrative sales of the 
public debt instruments via captive bond issues to the banking 
sector inhibit the role of the bond interest rate in equilibrating 
the asset markets, causing them to be oversensitive tomacro 
adjustment; 
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3. There would be strong gains towards private deepening of 
the financial markets in return to a policy of deregulation of
the government's bond financing rules, and reduction in the 
liquidity ratio for the commercial banking system. However, 
costs of such a policy maneuver to the fiscal authority seem 
to be prohibitively high and unsustainable. The remaining 
alternative of monetization and seignorage, on the other 
hand, is observed to lead to price inflation and industrial 
contraction. 
4. In an environment such as Turkey of the 1980s, as character- 
ized by high interest rates on domestic redit, large fiscal 
deficits and noncompetitive markup pricing rules on output, 
continued external resource transfers by way of debt servic- 
ing and prolonged currency devaluation have had contrac- 
tionary effects on output and private incomes, and have been 
severely inflationary. Under such an environment, the method 
of deficit financing through the domestic financial markets 
have resulted in a double squeeze of the domestic funds, 
crowding out and destabilizing the fragile credit markets. 
At a more general evel, our modeling exercise supports the 
notion that the general equilibrium attributes of a market economy 
can be successfully extended to cover both the fiscal and the 
monetary problems in a consistent fashion. Especially, for the 
developing economies where the lack of sufficiently long time 
series data often precludes applications of the econometric tech- 
niques, the possibility of utilizing the real financial general equilib- 
rium models based on the calibration techniques may prove very 
powerful in conducting policy-relevant research. 
APPENDIX  
Table AI :  Documentat ion  of  the  CGE Mode l  
This table gives a formal presentation of the CGE model used in the paper. The 
documentation adheres to the following legend: upper case letters without a bar are 
endogenous variables; those with a bar denote variables that are treated exogenous. Lower 
case and Greek letters refer to policy variables or structural parameters. Subscripts i and 
j refer to sectors, k refers to labor types, and h to household categories. Nonlinear elations 
are not explicitly spelled out, as their forms are part of the traditional CGE folklore. The 
c(.) and d(.) refers to the composite and CET functions, and f(.) refers to CES production 
functions. 
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Private Households' Portfolio 
PFW, = PFWt i + q>HHSAV 
PFWt = BDEMH,  + TDEP~ + FCUR~ + MDEMt 
TDEP = TD • ( I+RR)*  
- -  [(ER/PLEV)I~ 
FCUR = FC ' [  ~ + ~ J 
MDEM, = Vy-+ V,[RR + (?,PLEV,/PLEV, ,)1 GDP 
BDEMH = BDH.  (I + BRR)  ~ 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Government's Portfolio 
GBND =y.  GRDEF (7) 
Private Enterprises' Portfolio 
PBNDt = ~ ~i" KWi 
i 
- -  [(1 + RRPI)] ~  `
DKPi = DKi [ (1  + R-~ J 
KW~ = kwri .  TVCi 
LOAND = E PK,.  DKPi + E (1 - ~r~) KW~ 
i i 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Commercial Banks' Portfolio 
BDEMB = h • TDEP • (1 + BRR)  ~ + BDB • (1 + BRR)  ~2 
(1 - p - h )TDEP - BDEMB = LOAN p 
(12) 
(13) 
Central Banks' Portfolio 
M s - MS_~ = (1 - ~) GRDEF - 9 ' ATDEP + AFRES~. ER (14) 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES:  
PFW, 
TDEP 
FCUR 
MDEM, 
BDEMH 
AGBND, 
APBND, 
KW, 
DKPi 
BDEMB 
LOAN ~ 
: current period private wealth 
: total saving deposits of private households 
: foreign currency demand 
: demand for domestic urrency in the current period 
: private demand for bonds and securities 
: stock of government bonds issued in the current period 
: stock of private bonds issued in the current period 
: working capital costs 
: private investment by sector of destination 
: bond demand by banks 
: private enterprises' credit demand from the banking sector 
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M, ~ 
AFRES, 
ER  
RR 
BRR 
: stock of domestic money supply in the current period 
: foreign reserve accumulation by the central bank 
: exchange rate (TL/U.S.$) 
: real interest rate 
: real rate of return on bonds 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS:  
PFW, I : 
TD : 
FC : 
DKI : 
BHD : 
BDB : 
PLEV,  i: 
MS_l : 
Vv, VR : 
t~ 
¢ 
~q 
~i 
h 
p 
~, f~ : 
.y 
T~ i
kwr~ : 
previous period private wealth 
trend level of saving deposits 
trend level of foreign currency demand 
trend level of private investment 
private bond demand shift parameter 
banks' bond demand shift parameter 
previous period price level 
previous period stock of money supply 
parameters of the money demand velocity function 
ratio of financial savings to aggregate private savings 
interest elasticity of saving deposits 
elasticity of foreign currency demand 
elasticity of private bond demand 
interest elasticity of private investment demand 
liquidity (disponibility) ratio 
required reserve ratio 
elasticities of captive and voluntary bond demand by banks 
government bonds issuing rate 
private bonds issuing rate 
ratio of working capital costs to total variable costs 
Pr ice  Format ion  
PMi = 
PE~ = 
PCi = 
PXi = 
PVAi = 
PK~ = 
PLEV~ = 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES:  
PM, : domestic price of imports 
PE~ : domestic price of exports 
PG : composite good price 
PX~ : producer price 
PVAs : value added (net) price 
PWMi" (1 + tml) - ER 
PWEi.  (1 + te~) • ER 
PD~. (DG/CC~) + PM~. (M~/CC~) 
PD~. (DC]XS~) + PE~- (E]XS 0 
PXi. (1 - tni - SINi) - ,~, ail. PCj 
J 
PCj. bj~ 
i 
toi. PDi 
i 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
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PK, : price of physical  capital  
PD~ : domest ic  price of the domest ic  good 
PLEV, : price level 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS: 
tra~ : tariff rate on import  
te~ : subsidy rate on export 
tn~ : indirect tax rate 
a~/ : input-output  (Leontieff)  coefficients 
b,j : capital  composi t ion coefficients 
to : price level index weights 
PWM~: world price of imports  
PWE~ : world price of exports 
Production and Factor Markets 
PXi = [1 + "r i q- RR • (1 - wl) " kwri] ' AVCi  
with "rt = PLEVt • "r, t 
Tt ~ Tt--l 
PVA~. (OXSJOL,~) = W~k 
U~ = L s E Li~ 
i 
SINi = RR.  (1 - ~)  • KW~/(PXi • XS~) 
RPi = PVA i .  XSi + ~.S IN j .  PX i .XS j -  ~Wik .  L D, 
j k 
RPj = PVA j .  XSj - .~, Wjk • L~, 
k 
RRPi  = RPi/(PKi " Ki) 
TVCi = ~ Wik " L~ + ~ aji '  PCj XSi 
k j 
AVCi  = TVCi/( I  - tni) . XSi 
i = industry 
. . .  if APLEV, > 0, 
• . .  otherwise 
j = nonindustr ia l  sectors 
i = commerce 
j = noncommerc ia l  sectors 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES: 
XS~ : output  supply 
L~ : labor  demand (employment)  of type k, by sector i. 
Uk : unemployed labor 
SIN, : share of interest costs in value of output  
RP~ : aggregate profits 
RRP, : sectoral  profit rate 
TVCi : total  var iable costs 
A VCi: average variable cost 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS: 
T~ : markup  rate (i = industry) 
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K~ : physical  capital  stock 
W~k : nomina l  wage rate 
Lk : labor supply 
Income Generation and Saving Flow 
YR H = PVAA • XSA + I~R • RM • ER  + TR A 
Y~ = ~W~k'L~ + (1 - tXR) 'RM'ER + TRw 
i 
Y~ = .~ RP~ + TRK + PBOR • ER  - PRTROW • ER 
GREV = TARIFF  + INDTAX + HHTAX 
TARIFF  = ~ tm~ . PWM~. Mi • ER  
i 
INDTAX = Y~ tn~. PXi" XSI 
i 
HHTAX = ~ htXh - Y~ 
h 
GREXP = G IF  + GDTOT + EXSUB + ~ TRh - GRTROW • ER 
h 
EXSUB = ~] te l .  PWEI .  E~. ER  
GRDEF = GREXP - GREV - GBOR • ER  
HHSAV = E oh" Y~" (1 - htXh) 
h 
GSAV = ~rG •GREv 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES" 
Ynn,w,K : total  income of rural, worker,  and capital ist  households,  respect ively 
GREV : total  fiscal revenues of the government  
TARIFF : tariff revenues from imports  
INDTAX:  indirect tax revenues 
HHTAX : household  income tax revenues 
EXSUB : export  subsidy payments  
GREXP : total  government  expendi tures  
HHSAV: : aggregate pr ivate (household)  savings 
GSAV : aggregate publ ic (government)  savings 
GRDEF : government 's  fiscal deficit 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS:  
~LR 
htxh 
ffh 
cra~_ 
RM 
TRh 
share of remittances accruing to rural  households 
household income tax rate 
margina l  propensi ty  to save of households  
publ ic savings rat io 
total  remittances from abroad 
current transfers to households  
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GIF : aggregate public investment 
GDTOT : aggregate public consumption 
GBOR : public borrowing from abroad 
-PBOR : private borrowing from abroad 
GRTROW : government transfers abroad 
PRTROW : private transfers abroad 
Final Demand Generation 
XDi  = di (DC, Ei)  
CCi = ci (DCiMi) = CDi + ODi + Vi + IDi 
DCi = DCRi.  CCi  
DCRi = 0Ci (DCi. Mi)/0Dfi given PMi/PDi 
Mi = .0ci (DCi, Mi)/0Mi given PMi/PDIi 
Ei = adi (DCi, Ei)/OEi given PEi/PDi 
E i=~i [PWE, ' (1  +te i ) 'ER]  ~i 
PD~ 
Vi = ~a, j -xs j  
J 
CDi = (cd~/PC~) ~ Y~ • (1 - htxh) • (1 - ~rh) 
h 
GDi = (gdl/PCi) GDTOT 
DKGI = (kgi/PKi) GIF 
ID~ = ~ b~j (DKPj + DKG;) 
J 
GDP = ~ (PVA~ + SINi" PX.)XSI + TARIFF + INDTAX 
i 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES: 
DC, : Armingtonian domestic commodity 
E; : exports 
M~ : imports 
DCR;: share of domestic ommodity in the Armingtonian composite 
CC; : Armingtonian composite commodity 
CD; : private consumption demand 
GD; : public consumption demand 
V; : intermediate input demand 
DKG~: public investment by destination 
ID; : aggregate investment demand by sector of origin 
GDP : gross domestic product 
XD; : aggregate domestic demand 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS: 
E; : trend level of export demand 
112 
cd~ : sectoral share of private consumption demand 
gd,. : sectoral share public consumption demand 
kg~ : sectoral share of public investment by destination 
8 : elasticity of export demand 
Domestic Markets Equilibrium Conditions 
COMMODITY MARKETS 
XSi  -- XD i 
DOMESTIC CURRENCY MARKET 
M s = MDEM,  
FOREIGN CURRENCY MARKET (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS) 
~, PWMi '  Mi = ~ PWEi" Ei - AFCUR + RM + PBOR - PRTROW 
i i 
+ GBOR - GRTROW 
BONDS MARKET 
GBND + ~ PBND~ = BDEMH + BDEMB 
i 
CREDIT MARKET 
(1 - p - X) TDEP - BDEMB = ]~ PKg. DKP~ + ~, (1 - ,.~) • KW~ 
SAVING-INVESTMENT BALANCE 
~, trhYh (1 -- htXh) + O'G GREV = ~ PK~ • DKP~ + GIF  + AFRESt • ER  
h i 
A.  E .  Ye ldan  
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(6o) 
(61) 
(62) 
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Table A2: Values of Key Parameters and Policy Instruments 
in the Base-Year 
Private Households' Portfolio 
Interest elasticity of saving deposits (t~) 2.500 
Elasticity of currency substitution (~) 1.500 
Elasticity of bond demand (Xl) 1.500 
Currency demand function velocity parameters 
Income (Vy) 3.331 
Interest rate (VR) 1.132 
Banks' Portfolio 
share of disponibility-related (captive) GDI holdings 0.850 
Elasticity of captive GDI holdings (13~) 3.000 
Elasticity of voluntary GDI holdings (132) 4.500 
Government Portfolio 
Fiscal debt bond financing ratio (~) 0.700 
Ratio of government's fi cal deficit to GDP 0.051 
Enterprise Portfolio 
Private bond financing ratio (~) 
Industry 0.010 
Ratio of working capital balances to total variable costs (kwr) 
Industry 0.239 
Interest elasticity of investment demand (~) 
Industry 0.400 
Central Bank's Portfolio 
Reserve requirement ratio (p) 0.093 
Price Formation 
Average variable costs (AVC) 
Agriculture 0.715 
Industry 0.745 
Commerce 0.492 
Public Services 0.375 
Markup rate (T) 
Industry 0.335 
Tariff rate (tm) 
Agriculture 0.091 
Industry 0.173 
Indirect tax rate (tn) 
Agriculture 0.003 
Industry 0.029 
Commerce 0.06l 
Public services 0.032 
Production and Factor Markets 
Elasticity of substitution among capital and labor 
Agriculture 0.500 
Industry 0.400 
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Commerce 
Public Services 
Share of capital in value added 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Public Services 
Income Generation and Saving Flow 
Income tax rate (htx) 
Rural 
Urban worker 
Urban capitalists 
Production tax rate 
Household saving propensities (~h) 
Rural 
Urban worker 
Urban capitalist 
Government saving ratio (crc) 
Final Demand Generation 
Private consumption sectoral shares (cd) 
Rural Urban worker 
Agriculture 0.214 0.085 
Industry 0.551 0.657 
Commerce 0.126 0.133 
Public services 0.109 0.125 
Public consumption sectoral shares (gd) 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Public services 
Public investment sectoral destination shares (kg) 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Public services 
Domestic goods-export transformation elasticity 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Domestic goods-import substitution elasticity 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Elasticity of export demand (g) 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Ratio of domestic goods in the Armingtonian composite aggregate 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Commerce 
Public services 
0.400 
0.200 
0.421 
0.762 
0.703 
0.697 
0.032 
0.194 
0.135 
0.022 
0.110 
0.129 
0.241 
0.282 
Urban capitalist 
0.065 
0.622 
0.161 
0.152 
0.006 
0.269 
0.053 
0.672 
0.079 
0.328 
0.125 
0.468 
1.200 
0.600 
0.550 
1.200 
0.600 
3.000 
1.250 
1.250 
0.947 
0.789 
1.000 
1.000 
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